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Training and low-pay mobility
1 Introduction
The issue of low-pay mobility is receiving increasing interest in the economic and political
debate (OECD, 1996, 1997, 2003; Acemoglu, 2003b, 2003a). Low-pay mobility may have
an equalizing effect on the earnings of workers at the bottom of the wage distribution.
Specifically, the higher the level of upward low-pay mobility, the greater the chances for
the low-wage workers to improve their earnings level in their career. The earnings mobility
opportunities of workers is believed to increase by policies that enhance the participation
in in-firm training programmes. This is also suggested by human capital theory which
states that investments in training and education pay-off for people’s life-time earnings
(Becker, 1975). Through training, low-paid workers may improve their skills and their
productivity and therewith increase their wage in the same or in a different job. Previous
research suggests that training has a positive effect on wages, especially when the worker
stays in the same job (see section 2). However, the effect of training on low-pay mobility
has not been explicitly investigated.
Moreover, studies on low-pay mobility typically do not control for measurement error or
for the fact that some of the true observed mobility is completely transitory, i.e. caused by
random shocks, and therefore, it is not explained by the economic process. It is well known
that the presence of measurement error in income data from household surveys results
into severe overestimation of mobility (Hagenaars, 1994; Pischke, 1995; Gottschalk, 2005).
Rendtel et al. (1998) find that approximately half of the observed poverty transitions from
the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) are spurious. Besides the overestimation of
average mobility, measurement error underestimates the effect of the usual covariates of
earnings (Bound et al., 2001). When failing to control for classification error, the dependent
variable in an earnings transition model contains noise. As a result, the effect of covariates
in such a model will, most probably, be underestimated.1 The effect of the presence of
’randomness’ in low-pay mobility is similar to measurement error. If a person’s wage is
under the low-pay threshold but lies still very close to it, then even a light ’churning’ in the
wage distribution - unrelated to any individual factors, such as experience accumulation or
job change - may turn the wage above the threshold. In this way, overall low-pay mobility
increases and the effect of the covariates on earnings is attenuated.
1This is not always the case. It rather depends on whether there is error in the measurement of the
covariates and on whether this error is correlated with the error in the earnings.
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The aim of this paper is to investigate the effect of training on low-pay mobility, ac-
counting for measurement error and ’randomness’ in mobility patterns. For this purpose,
we develop a panel multinomial logit model for low-pay transitions with a latent struc-
ture that corrects for measurement error. The model is a Mixed Latent Markov model
that is advancing the model of Rendtel et al. (1998). While Rendtel et al control for
measurement error in aggregate transition probabilities, we also correct for observed and
unobserved heterogeneity, and moreover, we use much longer time series. In this way,
we relax the unattractive property of population homogeneity that is assumed in most
studies using Markov models on labour market transitions. In our analysis, we distin-
guish among three states, namely, low-paid, higher-paid and the state of non-employment.
For low pay, we apply the most common definition which is also used by the OECD: the
threshold is set to the two-thirds of the median wage (OECD, 1996). The analysis is per-
formed in two countries with rather different labour markets and training practices: the
UK with a liberal-unregulated labour market and the Netherlands with a semi-regulated
labour market. Following the predictions derived from the Varieties of Capitalist (VOC)
approach (Hall & Soskice, 2001), we assume that training practices will differ markedly
across the two regimes. The VOC approach distinguishes between liberal or unregulated
market economies (LME) and regulated or coordinated market economies (CME) that are
believed to be in sharp contrast with respect to wage setting and skill formation. The
CME’s are expected to focus on developing specific skills at the industry or the company
level, coordinated wage bargaining and strong employee representation, whereas LME’s
are featured by low investments in training and skill formation, investments in general
skills more than in firm-specific skills and flexible wages, reflecting more closely individual
productivity, general education and work experience (Soskice, 2005). Therefore, we hy-
pothesize that the unregulated British labour market invests less in skill formation than
the coordinated Dutch labour market, and that the UK may be characterized as a ’general
skills regime’, whereas the Netherlands as a ’specific skills regime’. First, we investigate
the effect of training incidence in the UK and the Netherlands. In a second step, we restrict
our analysis to the UK to account for the effect of different types of training - job-related
or firm-specific training and general training - as well as for the effect of the duration of
the training programme.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature on the relationship
between training and earnings. Section 3 elaborates on the model we apply. Section 4
2
Training and low-pay mobility
presents the two datasets that we use. In section 5, we discuss the results of our analysis.
Finally, section 6 concludes and presents some issues for further research.
2 The relationship between training and earnings
The relationship between human capital and earnings is well documented in economics
(see, for example, Becker, 1962; Mincer, 1986). Standard economic theory suggests that
there are two types of human capital that affect earnings formation. These two types are
general human capital which concerns skills that a worker accumulates from education and
from labour market experience, and firm-specific human capital which refers to skills that
a worker acquires on the job and are usually not transferable across employers. General
education and formal vocational training provide skills that increase the productivity of
the worker throughout his working career. However, the effect of short-term training
programmes is ambiguous. Some of them provide skills and qualifications that the worker
can transfer from job to job, but others - especially on-the-job training programmes -
provide skills that are job or firm-specific. Human capital theory predicts that training has
a negative effect on earnings during the period of training provision, as the worker bears
the costs, and a positive effect thereafter, as the worker increases his productivity using
the new skills he acquired from training.
Empirical evidence is rather in accordance with the predictions of the theory. Mincer
(1988) finds that American workers who received training have 4-6% higher wage growth
than the rest of the workers. He also finds that training creates steeper wage profiles,
regardless of whether the worker changes a firm or not. Parent (1999) suggests that there
are wage gains from training for young American workers and these gains are transferable
across employers. Booth (1991) suggests that wages of British male workers are 11.2%
higher when receiving training. For the female workers, the training premium is even
higher, namely, 18.1%. Lynch (1992) distinguishes between off-the-job and on-the-job
training of young workers in the US. She finds that previous off-the-job training, previous
apprenticeship and current on-the-job training increase wages. Moreover, she suggests that
there is quite some heterogeneity in the returns of training. These returns are higher for
the average and highly educated as well as for the unionized workers. Duncan and Hoffman
(1979) find that in the US, the returns to training are rather uniform between men and
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women as well as between native and immigrant workers. Nevertheless, they suggest that
differences in the amount of training account for as far as 20% of the earnings gap between
black and white workers and 10% of the earnings gap between male and female workers.
For the Netherlands, Leuven and Oosterbeek (2002) find no effect of training on earnings,
suggesting that the typical effect found in the relevant studies is actually due to unobserved
characteristics.
Studies that investigate low-pay mobility use training as a covariate despite the fact
that their focus has never been on training per se. For the UK, Sloane and Theodossiou
(1996) find that recent training increases the probability for a low-to-higher pay transition.
Similarly, Stewart and Swaffield (1999) find that in the UK, training reduces the probability
of remaining in low pay by 5-10%. Bla´zquez Cuesta and Salverda (2007) reach the same
conclusion for the Netherlands. They also find that the incidence of training is lower for the
low-paid workers than for their higher-paid colleagues. However, no study has ever focused
explicitly on the effect of training on low-pay mobility. Moreover, almost all the papers
which study the effect of training on wages consider only the training programmes that
the individual received, while being employed. Crucially, we extend this type of analysis
by including training while being unemployed.
At the country level, labour market institutions play an important role in determining
the provision and the characteristics of training. Acemoglou and Pischke (1998) suggest
that the more compressed the wage distribution in a country the higher the incentives
to firms to provide training and to share the training costs with their workers. When
employers face binding wage regulations, they prefer to increase the productivity of their
workers by providing them training opportunities. This reasoning resembles the assump-
tions of the VOC approach that were mentioned in the introduction. Specifically, in the
VOC approach, McCall and Orloff (2005) argue that employers in specific skills regimes
invest more in firm-specific training to increase productivity than employers in general
skills regimes, as turnover is more costly for the former. From the two countries under
scrutiny, the Netherlands may be characterised as a specific skills regime, while the UK as
a general skills regime. In more detail, the Netherlands is a country with a coordinated
but branch-level organised wage bargaining, more regulated employment relations and a
stronger engagement of trade unions in the organisation of work-related or firm-specific
training at the industry/branch level (Leisink & Greenwood, 2007). Training arrange-
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ments are very often part of the wage bargaining or the collective labour agreements at
the branch level, or CAOs, as they are called. Training programmes are typically carried
out in formal educational settings and are usually longer in duration compared to the UK
(OECD, 1999). However, there is firm heterogeneity in the provision of training. Large
firms and firms within the service sector (mainly, banking and insurance) are most likely
to offer training opportunities (van Loo & de Grip, 2003). On the contrary in the UK,
firm-specific training is of little importance and trade unions are hardly ever involved and
exert little influence on company’s training programmes. Though training is carried out
within the company, the size of the investments in training offered to workers is rather
low due to their short duration (Blundell et al., 1996; OECD, 1999). Previous empirical
findings show that training incidence is higher in the UK than in the Netherlands, but the
total amount of training that individuals receive is larger in the Netherlands than in the
UK (OECD, 1999; Pischke, 2001; Arulampalam et al., 2004).
In this paper, we focus on the effect of training on low-pay mobility. We consider
all training programmes that were followed in the year prior to the survey, regardless of
whether the individual was employed or not during the training period. In a second step,
we distinguish between job-related or firm-specific training and general training, and we
investigate the effect of the duration of training.
3 A Mixed Latent Markov model
Specification of the model
Our aim is to investigate the effect of enrolment in training on the year-to-year transitions
from- and to low pay. More specifically, we want to study the effect of training on ’real’ low-
pay mobility, i.e. low-pay mobility net of measurement error and transitory fluctuations
due to random shocks. Therefore, we start from a random-effects multinomial logit model
and we impose a latent structure in the framework of the Latent Markov models (van
de Pol & Langeheine, 1990; Langeheine & van de Pol, 1990; Vermunt et al., 1999; Bassi
et al., 2000). The simplest form of this model is depicted in Figure 1. According to
this model, the true state Xit of an individual i at a time point t cannot be observed; it
is a latent state. We rather observe state Yit, which might differ from the true (latent)
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Figure 1: Path diagram for the Latent Markov model
state Xit. Yit and Xit are probabilistically related.
2 The observed states at different time
points are mutually independent, conditional on the true latent states. In other words, we
assume that measurement error is not serially correlated in any way. This means that the
independent classification error (ICE) assumption is made (Bassi et al., 2000). The true
state Xit follows a Markov process. Thus, the state of an individual i at time point t, Xit,
is independent of the state at time point t′, Xit′ , where t′ < t − 1, conditionally on the
state at t− 1, Xit−1. An arrow indicates a direct effect, for example, the effect of the state
at one time point on the state at the next time point. In our study, Xit and Yit are the
2To understand how this model estimates measurement error, we present an example from Pavlopoulos
(2007). Let us assume a fictitious transition matrix for a discrete variable X with two categories and
between two time points. We further assume that there is error in the observation of the variable X.
Instead of X1 and X2, we rather observe the states Y1 and Y2. The model for the joint distribution of Y1
and Y2 has the form of a Latent Class model for two time points. More specifically, the joint distribution
of the observed states Y1 and Y2 can be expressed as follows:
P (Y1 = y1, Y2 = y2) =
∑
Y1,Y2
[P (X1 = x1)P (X2 = x2|X1 = x1) (1)
P (Y1 = y1|X1 = x1)P (Y2 = y2|X2 = x2)] .
In the above probability expression, P (X1 = x1) denotes the probability of being in the latent (true) state
x1 at the first time point and P (X2 = x2|X1 = x1) the probability of being in the latent state x2 at the
second time point, conditional on being in the latent state x1 at the first time point. The other two terms
refer to the relationship between the latent and observed states, and represent the measurement error
component. P (Y1 = y1|X1 = x1) denotes the probability of observing the state y1 conditional on being in
the latent (true) state x1. The expected observed transition probability is:
P (Y2 = y2|Y1 = y1) = P (Y1 = y1, Y2 = y2)
P (Y1 = y1)
=
P (Y1 = y1, Y2 = y2)∑
Y2
P (Y1 = y1, Y2 = y2)
. (2)
To illustrate the impact of measurement error, assume that P (X2 = x2|X1 = x1) = .05 for x1 6= x2 and
that P (Y1 = y1|X1 = x1) = P (Y2 = y1|X2 = x2) = .05 for y1 6= x1 and y2 6= x2. Using equations (1) and
(2) one can easily verify that the probability P (Y2 = y2|Y1 = y1) for y1 6= y2 equals .136 . In other words,
even a small amount of classification error (5%) results in a large increase in the number of the observed
transitions, here by a factor of 2.72 (13.6% observed versus 5% real transitions).
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true and observed earnings states, respectively. These states are assumed to take on three
values: low-paid, higher-paid and non-employed (’other’).3
The joint probability of having a particular state path conditional on covariate values
can be expressed as:
P (Yi = yi|Zi) =
∫ 3∑
x0=1
3∑
x1=1
...
3∑
xT=1
P (Xi0 = x0|Zi1, Fi)
T∏
t=1
[P (Xit = xt|Xit−1 = xt−1, Zit, Fi)]
T∏
t=0
P (Yit = yit|Xit = xt)f(Fi)dFi , (3)
where i = 1, ..., I is the index for the individual, t = 0, ..., T represents the time points and
f(Fi) is the joint density function for the individual effects Fi.
For identification reasons, we restrict the probability of observing a state Yit conditional
on the true state Xit to be constant over time, so P (Yt−1 = s|Xt−1 = r) = P (Yt = s|Xt = r)
for every t. With these restrictions, the model is identified when at least three time points
are observed (Vermunt et al., 1999).
The literature points to two major issues when using Markov models for low-pay mo-
bility: the need to control for heterogeneity (Shorrocks, 1976) and the need to control for
initial conditions (see, for example, Cappellari & Jenkins, 2004). We control for observed
heterogeneity with the approach suggested by Vermunt et al. (1999). Specifically, we allow
the covariates Zit to affect the latent transition probabilities between latent statesXit−1 and
Xit. These covariates are assumed to be uncorrelated with the error. As mentioned earlier,
to control for unobserved heterogeneity, we use the standard random-effects approach. As
far as the issue of initial conditions is concerned, our model estimates the probability of
being in a state in the initial time point P (Xi0 = x0|Zi1, Fi) and assumes perfect correla-
tion between the unobserved effects that affect the initial state and the unobserved effects
which affect the latent transition probability.
The probability P (Yit = yit|Xit = xt) represents the measurement or classification error.
3It is obvious that our definition of earnings states includes a state where the individual has no income
from paid employment, the ‘other’ or non-employment state. For reasons of simplicity, however, we will
refer to these states as ‘earnings states’, though with zero or little earnings.
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However, this model does not only filter out measurement error. What the model actually
does is to derive a pattern of ‘regular transition behaviour’ for individuals that belong to
state x from the longitudinal information for all individuals (Vermunt, 2004). A spurious
transition results into a violation of the first-order Markov process. However, a true but
’unexpected’ transition may also be classified as spurious. This may be the case if the
position of the worker in the wage distribution in t−1 was so close to the low-pay threshold
that a small overall change in the distribution moves him above this threshold in t. Thus,
the ‘true’ transitions we estimate are the transitions between the states xj and xk, when
accompanied by a change in the transition ‘behavior’; i.e. a change in the transition
‘behaviour’ of individuals in state xj to the transition ‘behaviour’ of individuals in state
xk. A further discussion on the validity of this model can be found in Pavlopoulos (2007).
Parameter estimation
The estimates for the parameters of our model are obtained by means of maximum like-
lihood. Specifically, we use a variant of the well-known Expected Maximization (EM)
algorithm (Dempster et al., 1977), which switches between an E step and a M step until
it achieves convergence. The E-step of the EM algorithm involves computing the expected
value of the complete data log-likelihood or, more intuitively, filling in the missing data
(here the unobserved class memberships and the unobserved random effects) with their
expected values given the current parameter values and the observed data. In the M step,
standard estimation methods are used to update the model parameter, such that the ex-
pected complete data log-likelihood is maximized. In our case, the M step involves using
the filled-in expected values as if these were observed in a standard logistic regression
analysis. The E and M steps cycle until a certain converge criterion is reached.
The relevant variant of EM, which is called the forward-backward or Baum-Welch algo-
rithm, is implemented in the recent syntax version of the statistical software LatentGOLD
(Vermunt & Magidson, 2008). The standard EM algorithm cannot be applied for Latent
Markov models for many time points T , as the time and storage needed for computa-
tion increases exponentially with T (Vermunt et al., 1999). The extended version of the
forward-backward algorithm that we apply supports control for unobserved heterogeneity
and multivariate analysis. These are features that are required for our analysis. Details on
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this algorithm can be found in Vermunt et al. (2008).
4 Data and main concepts
The study uses data for the period 1991-2004 from two national panel datasets. For the
UK, we use waves 1 to 14 of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) (Taylor et al.,
2006), covering the years 1991-2004. For the Netherlands, our data come from the Socio-
Economic Panel (SEP) (CBS, 1991). We make use of the last 9 waves of the panel, covering
the years 1994-2002.4
As we focus on earnings transitions of employed individuals, our sample consists of
prime age males (aged 25-55). The main reason for restricting our analysis to male em-
ployees is that females tend to have more career breaks and more intermittent periods of
temporary or permanent layoff for very different reasons than males, such as caring obliga-
tions. Thus, we cannot include women in our analysis without controlling for the factors
responsible for their different career paths, which goes beyond the scope of this paper. Our
main economic variable is the earnings state of the individual, defined as the level of the
hourly wage. As there is no direct information available on an individual’s hourly wage,
this is computed by dividing the earnings of last month from paid employment by the total
amount of the monthly hours worked. Unusual overtime pay and bonuses are not included
in the earnings of last month.
We define two real earnings states, low paid and higher paid, as well as an ‘other’
(non-employment) state. In more detail, the individuals that report paid employment as
their main employment status are classified in one of the two earnings states. The self-
employed are clustered in the ‘other’ state (non-employment state). Individuals who are
in education, in unemployment or in inactivity are also classified as non-employed. This
means that the ‘other’ state is very heterogeneous. This implies that transitions to and from
‘other’ cannot be expected to have a clear interpretation. However, the inclusion of such a
state in our dependent variable is important from both a substantial and methodological
point of view. Several studies, such as Cappellari and Jenkins (2004) and Stewart (2007)
show that transitions to non-employment are common for low-paid workers. Moreover,
4The BHPS data were made available by the Data Archive at Essex University. The SEP was made
accessible by Statistics Netherlands.
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ignoring the non-employment state would make it impossible to define a Latent Markov
model as the latent states should not only be mutually exclusive but also exhaustive.
Table 1: The distribution of the sample (in percentages)
UK Netherlands
Married 67.4 74.2
Age (mean) 39.2 40.2
Experience (mean in months) 241
Education Low 20.2 30.2
High school 28.8 43.5
Higher 51 26.3
Training 9.5
Job-related 11.3
General 16.7
Cases 7,884 4,214
The two datasets that are used include detailed information on training practices. From
the BHPS, for the first 7 waves, we use the question ’Since September 1st last year, have
you taken part in any education or training, other than training that was part of any
job you may have?’. For the rest of the waves, we use the question, ’Have you taken
part in any other training schemes or courses at all since September 1st (of the previous
year) or completed a course of training which led to a qualification?’. In the BHPS,
there is also information that allows the distinction between job-related or firm-specific
and general training as well as the identification of the duration of the enrolment in the
training programme. Following the BHPS questionnaire, we define training as ’job-related’
or ’firm-specific’, if the purpose of following the training programme was ’induction for
current job’, ’increase skills for current job’ or ’improve skills for current job’. When the
individual reports another purpose for following training than the aforementioned purposes,
we define training as ’general’. In the SEP, we create our training variable using the
following question about training programmes that individuals follow at the time of the
survey: ’At this moment are you following an educational or other course in a school, in
a training institute or in the firm you are working?’. As we are interested in the effect of
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completed training programmes, we derive information on training in year t from the survey
in year t− 1. Finally, in both datasets, the relevant questions refer to all types of courses,
both part-time courses and full-time programmes. The distribution of our estimation
sample is given in Table 1. This table includes all the covariates that we include in our
multivariate analysis.
Each individual is included in the analysis from the time point he first enters the
survey. Using maximum likelihood estimation with missing data, we deal with the fact
that at some occasions information for the earnings state of the individual may be missing,
due to non-response or temporary attrition. This approach does not cause any bias as
long as non-response is random conditionally on observed values, that is, as long as the
missing data is missing at random (MAR). Missing values in covariates were imputed by
interpolation when possible.5 The remaining missing values were imputed by the mean of
the relevant variable.
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Figure 1: Training incidence across countries in percentages.
5For example, if the individual reported ‘higher education’ in t−1 and t+1, and the value for education
was missing for t, we imputed the value for education in t as being ‘higher education’.
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5 Results
Some descriptives
The incidence of training over time is depicted in Figure 1. The percentage of workers that
receive training is unexpectedly higher in the UK than in the Netherlands. Specifically,
in the UK, 23.5-34.4% of male employees go through some type of training every year.
However, the percentage of trainees decreases over time. In the Netherlands, the incidence
of training varies between 8% and 11.9% but without any clear trend. These findings are
in accordance with Arulampalam et al. (2004).
Table 2: Low-pay mobility conditional on training incidence (in percentages)
State in t UK Netherlands
no training training Total no training training Total
Low pay 53.3 45.6 51.7 48.5 39.78 47.47
Higher pay 36.9 48.2 39.4 2.92 54.84 44.32
Other 9.7 6.2 8.9 8.58 5.38 8.21
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Pearson
(prob)
30.07 (0.000) 4.97 (0.083)
Cases 2,316 702 3,018 669 93 792
Note: This table presents the distribution of individuals that were in low pay in year t − 1
in destination states in year t according to whether they received training between the time
point t− 1 and t.
Table 2 presents some descriptives on the effect of training on low-pay mobility. In both
countries, the percentage of low-paid workers that pass the low-pay threshold in a period
of one year is higher for those that have followed a training course. In the UK, 48.2% of
the low-paid workers that received training moved to higher pay, as opposed to only 36.9%
of their colleagues that did not receive any training. In the Netherlands, 54.8% of the
low-paid workers that finished a training course passed the threshold, as opposed to only
42.9% of those that did not follow a training course. The Pearson chi-square statistic shows
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that the association between the earnings state and the training incidence is significant (in
the Netherlands only at the 10% level). However, the association of training with low-pay
mobility may just be capturing the effect of observed and unobserved heterogeneity. The
multivariate analysis that follows will be more informative on this issue.
Table 3: Model comparison
UK Netherlands
LL BIC (LL) LL BIC (LL)
1. Markov -21,015.9 42,695.8 -9,260.6 18,894.3
2. Latent Markov -20,205.3 40,966.9 -8,948.7 18,321.4
3. Mixed Markov -20,612.4 41,763.2 -8,994.8 18,396.6
4. Mixed Latent Markov -20,118.5 40,829.1 -8,925.3 18,308.6
Note: LL refers to the Log Likelihood and BIC (LL) refers to the Bayesian Information
Criterion that is based on the Log Likelihood value.
Results of the multivariate analysis
In total, we applied four versions of the model described by equation (3); namely, a standard
Markov transition multinomial logit model, a model with a latent structure (Latent Markov
model), a model with random-effects (Mixed Markov), and a random-effects model with
a latent structure (Mixed Latent Markov model) correcting for observed and unobserved
heterogeneity. The second and the fourth model correct for measurement error. The Log-
Likelihood values and the BIC values for all four models are reported in Table 3. This Table
shows that Model 2 fits the data considerably better than Model 1. The same holds for
Model 4 and Model 3, respectively. This indicates that correcting for measurement error
is important, regardless of whether we control for observed and unobserved heterogeneity.
Moreover, controlling for observed and unobserved heterogeneity improves the fit of the
model, as can be seen by comparing the fit of either Models 1 and 3 or Models 2 and 4.
The estimates of training and other covariates from Models 3 and 4 are presented in
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Table 4: Results from the Mixed Markov and the Mixed Latent Markov model
Transition
UK Netherlands
Without error With error Without error With error
correction correction correction correction
Training
low pay to higher pay 0.238∗∗ 0.287∗∗ 0.595∗∗ 0.826∗∗
low pay to other -0.157 -0.380 -0.424 -1.526∗∗
higher pay to low pay -0.328∗∗∗ -0.304∗∗∗ -0.306 -0.692
higher pay to other -0.172∗∗ -0.243∗∗∗ -1.805∗∗∗ -1.959∗∗∗
Education (ref. lower than high school)
High school
low pay to higher pay 0.062 0.079 0.213 0.261
low pay to other 0.119 -0.038 0.263 0.042
higher pay to low pay -0.072 -0.113 -0.704∗∗∗ -1.164∗∗∗
higher pay to other -0.044 -0.043 -0.356∗∗∗ -0.342
Higher education
low pay to higher pay 0.466∗∗∗ 0.527∗∗∗ 1.041∗∗∗ 1.241∗∗∗
low pay to other 0.158∗ 0.245∗ 1.800∗∗∗ 1.527∗∗∗
higher pay to low pay -0.746∗∗∗ -0.803∗∗∗ -1.557∗∗∗ -2.124∗∗∗
higher pay to other -0.160∗∗∗ -0.087 -0.364∗∗ -0.340∗∗
Experience
(Age for the
Netherlands)
low pay to higher pay -0.070 0.026 0.011 0.037
low pay to other -0.713∗∗∗ -0.894∗∗∗ 0.005 0.031∗
higher pay to low pay -0.515∗∗∗ -0.567∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗ -0.088∗∗∗
higher pay to other -0.703∗∗∗ 0.871∗∗∗ -0.004 -0.003
Cases 7,884 7,884 4,214 4,214
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The dependent variable is the earnings state. It takes three values: low pay, higher pay and other. Transitions between
all states are modelled. However, here we only present the estimates on the transitions from low to higher pay, from low
to the ‘other’ state and from higher to low pay. The control variables are calendar time, marital status, age, age squared,
experience squared (only in the UK). Other job characteristics are not included as covariates as these are not observed for
the individuals being in the ’other’ state and therefore their inclusion would make estimation of the model unfeasible.
Table 4. One commonly-used specification is to allow covariates to affect the probability
of being in a certain state at a time point t. We use another more flexible specification in
which covariates exert an effect on making a particular type of transition. For example,
the model estimates the effect of training on making a transition from low pay to higher
pay rather than ‘just’ estimating the effect of training on being in low pay. Our model
estimates the effect of training and other covariates on all six possible transitions between
the three states (low pay, higher pay, other). In Table 4, we only present the estimates for
the transitions from low pay and from higher pay to any other state, as these are the most
important with respect to our research questions.
Our results show that training has a positive effect on the likelihood of a low-to-higher
pay transition. In both countries, the relevant coefficient is positive. Results concerning
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the likelihood of the opposite transition, i.e. a transition from higher pay to low pay, are
consistent with the previous finding, as all coefficients are negative, although not always
statistically significant. More specifically, in the UK, this effect is clear, as the relevant
coefficient is statistically significant, while in the Netherlands, coefficients are negative but
insignificant. As far as transitions from employment to non-employment are concerned, we
find that in both countries, following a training course reduces the likelihood of moving out
of employment. However, in the UK, only the coefficient for the higher pay to the ’other’
state transition is significant. It seems, therefore, that training improves the employment
prospects - or strengthens the work-oriented attitude, as we do not distinguish between
quits and lay offs - both in the UK and the Netherlands.
The correction for measurement error and transitory earnings’ fluctuations strengthens
most of the effects. Comparing the estimates of model 3 and model 4, we see that most
of the estimated coefficients of model 4 are larger than those of model 3. This difference
in the coefficients was tested with a Hausman test and was found significant. This finding
holds for the estimates of all covariates included in Table 4.
The results with respect to education are in accordance with economic theory. In both
countries, having completed higher education increases the likelihood for a low-to-higher
pay transition and decreases the likelihood for a higher-to-low pay transition compared to
having completed low education. Having completed high-school education seems to have
a similar effect, although most coefficients are insignificant. Concerning labour market
experience, we find no significantly positive effect for transitions from low pay to higher
pay. On the contrary, we find a negative effect of experience on the likelihood of moving
from higher pay to low pay.6
Previous studies suggest that there are complementarities in the effect of training,
education and labour market experience on earnings (Lynch, 1992). The presence of such
complementarities in the effect of these variables on low-pay mobility was tested with the
inclusion of several interaction effects between training and these variables.7 None of these
interaction effects appeared significant. This suggests that such complementarities do not
exist for low-pay mobility. At a first sight, this finding seems contradictory to previous
studies. One may think that this is due to the fact that, so far, we have not distinguished
6For the Netherlands, we report the coefficients for age as a proxy for labour market experience. The
Dutch Socio-Economic Panel does not allow to derive reliable information on labour market experience.
7The estimates for these interaction effects are not presented here, but are available on request.
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between different types of training and have not taken into account the duration of the
training programme. This issue is addressed in the following sub-section.
Table 5: Type and duration of training effects in the UK
Model 4a Model 4b
Job-related
training
low to higher 0.566
Job-related
training
0.289
low to other 0.363 -2.251∗∗∗
higher to low 0.496 -0.808∗∗∗
higher to other -0.097 -1.654∗∗∗
General
training
low to higher -0.150
General
training
0.241
low to other 0.176 -0.584
higher to low 0.185 -0.427∗
higher to other 0.658∗∗∗ 0.001
High-school
(ref. low)
low to higher 0.540∗∗∗
High-school
(ref. low)
0.612∗∗∗
low to other 0.164 0.206
higher to low -1.208∗∗∗ -1.508∗∗∗
higher to other -0.113 -0.155
Higher
(ref. low)
low to higher 1.293∗∗∗
Higher
(ref. low)
1.631∗∗∗
low to other 0.674∗∗∗ 0.892∗∗∗
higher to low -1.909∗∗∗ -2.295∗∗∗
higher to other -0.163 -0.213
Higher *
job-related
training
low to higher 0.103∗∗
Duration *
job-related
training
0.212
low to other -1.677∗∗∗ 0.223
higher to low -1.753∗∗∗ 3.369
higher to other -1.029∗∗∗ 0.089
Higher *
general training
low to higher 0.686
Duration *
general training
0.161
low to other -2.930∗∗∗ 0.154
higher to low 0.397 3.361
higher to other 0.047 0.044
Cases 7,884 4,214
Log-Likelihood 43,597 42,413.5
BIC 21,089.2 20,452.6
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Models 4a and 4b are the same as the model that corrects for measurement error in Table 4.
Model 4a includes the interaction terms between training and education, while Model 4b includes
the interaction terms between the type of training and the duration of training.
Does the type and the duration of training matter?
In this sub-section, we refine the analysis of the previous part by distinguishing between
job-related or firm-specific training and general training. Moreover, we account for the
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effect of the duration of the training course. As the information on the type of the training
course and the duration of training seems unreliable in SEP, we perform this analysis only
for the UK. Specifically, we employ the same model as in the previous part (Model 4) using
two versions of it. In the first version (which we name Model 4a), our variable ’training’
takes three values: no training, job-related training and general training. In the second
version (which we name Model 4b), we also control for the duration of the training course.
Table 5 presents the results of these models. Note that only the models that correct for
measurement error are presented in Table 5.
Table 5 shows that the type of training matters for low-wage mobility, while the duration
of the enrolment in the training programme does not. Moreover, we find complementarities
of job-related training with education. In more detail, only for the high-school graduates
and the higher education graduates does job-related training increase the likelihood of a
low-to-higher pay transition and decrease the likelihood of a higher-to-low pay transition.
No significant effect is found for the low-educated workers. This finding is in accordance
with previous research on the relationship between job-related training and earnings. Gen-
eral training has no significant effect on the likelihood of moving between low and higher
pay for any group of workers.
On the other hand, the duration of the training programme does not affect the likelihood
of moving from low to higher pay or vice versa. This result holds for both job-related or
firm-specific training and general training programmes. Therefore, it seems that what
matters for low pay mobility is the type of training and the person’s level of education but
not the duration of the enrolment in the training programme.
6 Conclusions and discussion
The aim of this paper was to investigate the effect of training on low-pay mobility in
the UK and the Netherlands. We employed a modelling approach that enabled us to
study the effect of training investments on low-pay mobility, net of measurement error
and transitory moves out and into low pay due to random shocks. In contradistinction to
previous studies, we investigated the effect of all training programmes, regardless of the
employment status of the individual at the time of the training. For the UK, in a second
step, we distinguished between different types of training programmes and moreover we
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studied the effect of the duration of the training programme. Throughout our analysis, we
distinguished between three states, low pay, higher pay and non-employment (’other’), and
we used the most common definition of low-pay threshold, namely, the two-thirds of the
median hourly wage. Our approach combined the virtues of a random-effects multinomial
logit model and latent class modelling. The use of a random-effects model allowed us to
control for unobserved heterogeneity.
Contrary to what economic theory suggests, it turns out that in the flexible British
labour market, that is characterized by more turnover and wage inequality, training is
more common than in the regulated Dutch labour market that is characterized by less
turnover, low wage inequality and heavy involvement of trade unions in the organization
of training at the industry-branch level. However, we should keep in mind that training in
the UK refers to training programmes of short duration organized within the company. In
the regulated Dutch labour market, training is less common than in the UK, but the longer
enrolment in training implies that the size of the investment in training of the workers is
probably larger than in the UK.
The results of our analysis indicate that training improves the chances for upward wage
mobility for the workers of the lower segment of the wage distribution and reduces the risk
of higher paid workers to move down the pay ladder and fall into low pay. In this respect,
our results complement the findings of other studies in the field, suggesting that training
improves earnings’ prospects (Duncan & Hoffman, 1979; Booth, 1991; Lynch, 1992; Sloane
& Theodossiou, 1996; Bla´zquez Cuesta & Salverda, 2007). In both countries, we found a
strong positive effect of training on the likelihood of moving from low to higher pay. In the
UK, we also found that training reduces the likelihood of a higher-to-low pay transition.
Our study also verifies that besides training, general human capital in the form of formal
education increases the chances of low-paid workers to improve their wage as well as to
reduce the chances of higher paid workers to move down the pay ladder and fall into low
pay. These findings seem to corroborate the predictions derived from human capital theory
as well as the results of other studies in the field.
Previous studies suggest that the effect of training is not homogeneous across population
groups. The access to training and the pay-off to training differ according to education,
gender, age and immigrant status. At least in the UK, where the data allowed for it, we
investigated for complementarities between education and different types of training. The
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effect of training on low-wage mobility was found to depend on the type of the training
and on the person’s education level. Job-related or firm-specific training seems to pay-off,
but only for workers at the intermediate and the higher education level. Training appears
incapable of increasing the upward wage mobility chances of the lower-skilled workers.
Therefore, the investments in human capital formation seem efficient in flexible labour
markets, such as the UK, but only for the higher-skilled workers. This might reflect the
typical features of a very flexible labour market where general training is dominant but
pays-off less than firm-specific training. This asks for a shift in training policies in such
countries so that the lower-paid workers can benefit more by job-specific investments in
training that is offered within or outside the firm.
Appendix: Description of the variables
Education: This is the highest educational level completed by the individual. It can take
three values, lower than high school, high school and higher education.
Training: It takes the value 1 when the individual received formal training during the
year prior to the survey and 0 in all other cases.
Labour market experience: Measured in months. This is available only for the UK. It
is constructed by combining data from the yearly files and the employment history files of
BHPS.
Age: Measured in years.
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